El presente artículo pretende indagar en algunos tópicos relativos a las ideas de Marx y a las de Horkheimer presentes en la obra Teología de lo político de Clodovis Boff. En este análisis se observa una referencia explícita a la ideas del padre del marxismo donde Boff se acompaña con Marx, va más allá de Marx e incluso va contra Marx. Por otro lado, es posible identificar tres afinidades electivas que permiten suponer que la interpretación que Boff realiza del marxismo (...) deviene del padre de la teoría crítica, Max Horkheimer. The article below investigates topics related to Marx's and Horhkheimer's ideas as exposed in Theology of the Political by Clodovis Boff. The analysis shows a direct reference from Boff to the father of Marxism's ideas, going along, beyond and even against Marx. On the other hand, it is possible to identify three elective affinities that make us believe that his interpretation of Marx has its origin in the father of Critical Theory's ideas, Max Horkheimer. (shrink)

We review and discuss A. H. Louie’s book “More than Life Itself: A Reflexion on Formal Systems and Biology” from an interdisciplinary viewpoint, involving both biology and mathematics, taking into account new developments and related theories.

_Resumen:_ Al interior de la tradición clásica del derecho natural, los teólogos escolásticos de los siglos xvi-xvii describen ese derecho como simplemente necesario, así como inmutable y universal. Lo describen, además, como un orden objetivo, independiente de la voluntad de Dios. Sin embargo, no todos los teólogos escolásticos entienden la inmutabilidad del derecho natural de la misma forma, ni llaman “derecho natural” exactamente a lo mismo: para unos este es el “derecho de la naturaleza”, mientras que para otros es el (...) “derecho de la razón natural”. El artículo, así, aborda las principales diferencias que existen en las teorías de estos escolásticos sobre el derecho natural. (shrink)

Sebastián Madrid, Teresa Valdés, Roberto Celedón. Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano y Crea Equidad. 2020, 492 pp. Santiago, ISBN: 978-956-7382-50-7.

'Everyone knows what attention is’ according to William James. Much work on attention in psychology and neuroscience cites this famous phrase only to quickly dismiss it. But James is right about this: ‘attention’ was not introduced into psychology and neuroscience as a theoretical concept. I argue that we should therefore study attention with broadly the same methodology that David Marr has applied to the study of perception. By focusing more on Marr's Computational Level of analysis, we arrive at a unified (...) answer to the question of what attention is, what role it plays in the mind, and why organisms like us have that capacity. I propose a methodology for studying attention at Marr's Computational Level that optimizes in a three-dimensional space: it should capture core aspects of our first-person experience of attention, be explanatorily powerful in psychology and neuroscience, and fertile in an interdisciplinary context. I show how this methodology leads to what I call the priority structure account of attention. Attention is what organizes current information to make it more useful for the organism. We can identify it by four features. Attention, in this way, helps a cognitive system to integrate its informational state with its current motivational state. I describe how this account improves on alternatives and shows why attention is a useful concept in many disciplines and for connecting them. -/- This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

In Rethinking Language Arts: Passion and Practice, Second Edition , author Nina Zaragoza uses the form of letters to her students to engage pre-service teachers in reevaluating teaching practices. Zaragoza discusses and explains the need for teachers to be decision-makers, reflective thinkers, political beings, and agents of social change in order to create a positive and inclusive classroom setting. This book is both a critical text that deconstructs the way language arts are traditionally taught in our schools as (...) well as a visionary text with clear, no-nonsense directions on how to provide much needed change in our schools. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may (...) be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts. In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i.e., argumentative strategies). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil, and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods. While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular. As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...) of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es aclarar la crítica que el psicoanalista Jacques Lacan dirige al concepto marxista de plus-valía tal y como es formulado en el Capital de Marx. Tras el concepto de una plus-valía contable Lacan quiere desvelar la necesidad de atender a la noción más fundamental de un plus-de-gozar [plus-de-jouir] incontable. Atenderemos para ello a diferentes pasajes de sus seminarios XVI (1968-69), XVII (1969-70) y de su texto Radiofonía (1970).

Los textos acerca del tiempo de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) se organizan en torno a tres núcleos temáticos. En una primero época, en las Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia interna del tiempo (1904-1905), el hilo conductor es la pregunta acerca de cómo la percepción de un objeto que dura (tiempo objetivo) es constituida por una conciencia que vive en el tiempo inmanete y cómo esta es el resultado de un plano anterior -conciencia interna-. En un segundo momento, en los manuscritos (...) de Bernau (1917-1918) y en los textos sobre el carácter pasivo de los procesos de la conciencia (1921), Husserl profundiza en la relación entre conciencia, reflexión y temporalidad, y destaca la pasividad con la que se llevan a cabo las operaciones de constitución de la conciencia. Por último, en los manuscritos C (1929-1934) introducirá la noción de presente viviente como centro desde el que pensar toda la temporalidad. A la par que una investigación sobre el carácter eternamente enigmático del tiempo, los análisis de Jusserl revelan el ser fundamentalmente temporal de nuestra conciencia, en un ejercicio riguroso de pensamiento que lleva a la fenomenología hasta los límites de su potencial descriptivo. (shrink)

Se examinan las diversas modalidades de la nada como casos de pérdida del sentido y falta de consumación del conocimiento: la nada como noúmeno y su relación con el fenómeno, así como la conexión trascendental de ambos. Aunque la nada pone en jaque al concepto de sentido, este se encuentra supuesto antes de todo tipo de pregunta por el ser, y se constituye en el trasfondo de las condiciones trascendentales que posibilitan el conocimiento.

The three ancient philosophical introductions translated in this volume flesh out our picture of what it would have been like to sit in a first-year Philosophy course in ancient Alexandria. Ammonius (AD 445-517/26) set up a new teaching programme in Alexandria with up to six introductions to the philosophy curriculum, which made it far more accessible, and encouraged its spread from Greek to other cultures. This volume's three introductory texts include one by his student Olympiodorus and one each by Olympiodorus' (...) students Elias and David. Elias' Introductions to Philosophy starts with six definitions of Philosophy, to which David adds replies to the sceptical question whether there is such a thing as Philosophy. Olympiodorus' text translated here is an Introduction to Logic, which is just one of the three introductions he wrote himself. (shrink)

Resumen La naturaleza de las entidades matemáticas ha sido un problema filosófico recurrente en diversas épocas; aquí mostraré que fue una pieza clave en la definición de las posturas ontológicas durante la Modernidad temprana. La piedra de toque para la fundamentación de los conocimientos científicos fue el carácter que se atribuyó a las entidades matemáticas -y, en general, a las entidades abstractas, incluidas las lógicas- en la filosofía natural. Expongo dos posiciones de la Modernidad: la que defendió René Descartes, quien (...) las concibió como entidades perennes, inherentes a la propia constitución y funcionamiento de la mente y la de autores como Pierre Gassendi y Marin Mersenne, quienes defendieron el origen empírico e instrumental de esas entidades.The status of mathematical entities has been a recurrent philosophical problem in different times; here I explain how it was a key piece in the definition of ontological positions during Early Modernity. The touchstone for the foundation of scientific knowledge was the character assigned to mathematical entities -and, in general, to abstract entities, including logical ones- within the natural philosophy. I sketch two modern positions: on the one hand, the one defended by René Descartes, who assigned mathematical items a status of perennial entities, inherent to the very constitution and operation of the mind and, on the other, the one supported by authors such as Pierre Gassendi and Marin Mersenne, who defended the empirical and instrumental origin of those entities. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (ethical) discussion of AI (...) in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)

Se examinan las diversas modalidades de la nada como casos de pérdida del sentido y falta de consumación del conocimiento: la nada como noúmeno y su relación con el fenómeno, así como la conexión trascendental de ambos. Aunque la nada pone en jaque al concepto de sentido, este se encuentra supuesto antes de todo tipo de pregunta por el ser, y se constituye en el trasfondo de las condiciones trascendentales que posibilitan el conocimiento. Various modes of non-being are examined as (...) cases of loss of sense and as a lack of consummation of knowledge: non-being as noumena and its relationship with the phenomena, as well as the transcendental connection between them. Although non-being makes the concept of sense doubtful, it is presupposed before any kind of question regarding being and it is constituted in the background which belongs to the transcendental conditions which make knowledge possible. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo se estructura en torno a dos ejes: la concepción de la filosofía como una actividad extremadamente recursiva en su aplicación al saber científico, a la ética y a la pedagogía; la discusión en torno al realismo y al papel que le cabe a las representaciones en la explicación de la cognición. Se pone énfasis en mostrar la plausibilidad de los enfoques antirrepresentacionistas o constructivistas en las ciencias cognitivas, en la medida que estos enfoques pretenden superar las limitaciones (...) y prejuicios que son propios de los enfoques computacionalistas y conexionistas que le precedieron.This paper consists of two main topics: the conception of philosophy as an extremely recursive activity applied to scientific, ethics and educational knowledge; the discussion about realism and the role of the representations in the explanation of cognition. The validity of the anti-representationism or constructivist-based perspectives, is highlighted in Cognitive Sciences where these pretend to overcome the limitations and prejudices that belong to the previous computacionalism and connectionism perspectives. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper elaborates on a theory of the ideological public sphere in the age of digital media. It describes the public sphere as an initially ascending and then descending communication process that includes both polarising and integrating publics, which are organised by antagonistic media and compromise-building mass media. This framework allows us to distinguish between hegemonic, populist, and popular-oriented flows of communication, as well as register changes in the interplay of different publics driven by digital media platforms. Digital transformations of (...) the public sphere give rise to antagonistic and networked-individualistic flows of populist communication that put public hegemony under constant pressure. The challenge is to find ways to strengthen popular communications that enable democratic learning processes and the flourishing of communicative competences of all citizens. (shrink)

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-007-9045-2.

El psicoanalista francés Jacques Lacan piensa el objeto del deseo como un objeto que falta y que no puede ser representado. Por su parte, Gilles Deleuze y Félix Guattari rechazan en El Antiedipo cualquier concepción que relacione el deseo con la carencia y sostienen que el deseo es un proceso de producción de un objeto real presente. En su opinión el psicoanálisis lacaniano maldice al sujeto deseante condenándolo a una melancolía y a una insatisfacción perpetuas. El objetivo principal de este (...) artículo es rechazar esta crítica basándose en tres argumentos: una distinción entre la falta y la carencia, la consideración de la falta como no necesariamente negativa y la defensa de que un deseo limitado y parcialmente insatisfecho es más liberador que un deseo masivamente colmado. (shrink)

ResumenEste estudio ofrece una presentación del trabajo de investigación desarrollado en una tesis doctoral sobre el problema de la conciencia del tiempo en la fenomenología de Husserl defendida en la Universidad de Barcelona en abril del 2007. Tras justificar la importancia que el tema tiene para el pensamiento de Husserl son presentados los diferentes acercamientos a esta cuestión en cada una de las épocas de su pensamiento, distinguiendo fundamentalmente tres periodos: las lecciones sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo (1904/05), los (...) manuscritos de Bernau (1917/18) y los manuscritos C (1929/34).Palabras claveFenomenología, tiempo, conciencia, Husserl.AbstractThis paper offers a general overview of a research developed and defended as a PhD at the University of Barcelona in April 2007 concerning the problem of time- consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology. After justifying the relevance of the subject to Husserl, we present the different approaches to the problem of time-consciousness in every period of his thinking, distinguishing mainly three phases: the lessons about inner time consciousness (1904/05), the Bernauer manuscripts (1917/18) and the C- manuscripts (1929/34).KeywordsPhenomenology, time, consciousness, Husserl. (shrink)

Ernesto Laclau’s theory of hegemony interprets in a peculiar way two central concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis: the signifier and the real. Laclau maintains that signifiers are per se tendentially empty and that there is some constituting impossibility in every social system, that is, some real in the Lacanian sense. This paper levels two criticisms at this interpretation. Firstly, Lacan never employs the concept “empty signifier”: His definition of the signifier as that which represents a subject—and his enjoyment—for another signifier contradicts (...) this emptiness. Secondly, in the place of the impossible, Lacan puts enjoyment. The main political consequence of these two considerations is that the theory of hegemony is mistaken when focusing on the rhetorical debate and forgets that individual political inclinations are based mainly on their enjoyment. (shrink)